One of the most important problems in the theory of equilibrium with uncertainty is the relationship between equilibrium prices and traders' payoff-relevant information. The issue is: Can traders accurately forecast information available to others by observing only the equilibrium price? Such a forecast, if it exists, is a "rational expectation. " However, in any model of equilibrium with uncertainty, non-rational expectations equilibria exist. Why then are rational expectations equilibria of particular interest? The usual answer is, "If traders held incorrect beliefs, then over the course of time they would discover their error and modify their behavior accordingly."
In other words, over time traders learn the true relationship between information and prices. Rational expectations are, so this argument goes, globally stable equilibria of a dynamical system whose laws of motion are given by specifying traders' learning behavior.
In this paper we test this argument. Suppose each trader considers a finite collection of economic models, each mapping price to a probability OR ivate information. One model under consideration is assumed to be the tional model, i.e., a model that puts probability one on the actual information vector associated with an equilibrium price. Given an observation of an equilibrium price and an information vector each trader learns by updating a prior distribution over models. The learning rule takes a simple form: the prior weight on a model is increased if and only if the model predicts the observed outcome better than does the "average model," This learning rule would be a generalization of Bayesian learning if each trader had a correctly specified model of the relation between prices and information vectors that prevails when traders are learning.
ever, the learning process itself affects the observed relation between p and information vectors so none of the models (including the rational model) need be correct out of equilibrium.
The learning process that we describe can best be thought of as a boundedly rational version of Bayesian Iearning. Fully rational learning would require each trader to take into account the effect of his learning and the learning of others on equilibrium prices. However, the necessary structtue for such an analysis requires a degree of sophistication on the part of traders that seems highly implausible.
In our boundedly rational learning structure we find that for regular economies, rational expectations equilibria are locally stable, and there exist non-rational expectations equilibria that are also locally stable.
Our arguments are simply constructed. They depend upon finiteness of signals and of models, and continuity of the trader's learning rules.
The equilibrium model is described in Section 1. In Section 2, expectations are discussed. Dynamics are treated in Section 3 and examples are presented in Section 4. Conclusions are drawn in Section 5. See lume et a/. 111 for a discussion of the related literature.
NOTATION AND AssUhlPTro~s
We consider economies with K goods and N traders. Prices are vectors in the positive unit simplex AK-'. Trader n in period t observes a signal s,,, drawn from a finite set S,. Let S = nt= I S, denote the set of joint signa!s. These signals are correlated with some payoff-relevant random variables; thus knowledge of other traders' signals is payoff-relevant information for each trader ~ Suppose that joint signal s, E S were to occur. Denote by (sJn the nth trader's component of that signal. Each trader has a guess, given his own signal, as to the value of the joint signal, This guess can be represented by a probability distribution aat; an element of A#'-', the positive unit simplex of dimension #S -1. Denote'by a,,(s) the coordinate of a,, corresponding to joint signal s. We shall impose the following rationality requirement at the outset. Suppose that joint signal s E 5' has occurred. Then each trader's subjective beliefs about the true joint signal must satisfy a,,(~') > 0 implies (s'), = (s),. This is to say, trader N assigns probability 0 to all joint signals inconsistent with his own information. A.4. Excess demand for commodity K is bounded from below.
Thus each Z, is very well behaved. We know that for each a E A(s) there exists p E Int A"-' such that Z&p, a) = 0. Since 0 E IRK-' is a regular value of Z, the graph of the equilibrium correspondence is a manifold of codimension K -1 in (Int AK-') x A(s). It follows from the transversality theorem (Guilleman and Pollack [3, 68] ), that for generic a E A(s), Z,(p, a) = 0 implies that D,Z,(p, a) is surjective. In this instance a is said to be a regular vector of beliefs. Denote by a, E A(s) the vector of probability distributions such that each trader assigns probability 1 to joint signal s. A RREE { pS: s E S} is regular if a, is a regular vector of beliefs. Thus each trader can unambiguously assign probability 1 to joint signal s upon observing ps. Were each trader to do so and act accordingly, then excess demand at ps would be 0.
Our last assumption about excess demand is AS. A regular RREE exists.
The justification of this assumption depends upon the particular model used to derive the 2,. It is generically true, for example, in Radner's model {4 1. The model that we have in mind has excess demand depending upon beliefs about some exogenous payoff-relevant events. These events are correlated with joint signals, and so if traders make use of information about joint signals, they can improve their guesses about the occurrence of the payoff-relevant events. The excess demand functions Z, are derived from expressing excess demand as a function of prices and beliefs about events. If 0 is a regular value of this function, then for generic conditional probabilities of events given joint signals, A.5 will be true.
MODELS
In this section we consider how traders arrive at their beliefs. In brief, they do so by using models. Each trader observes his own signal and the equilibrium price vector. Using this information, the trader then forecasts which s has occurred. This forecast is made with a model of the re~ationsbi~ between (s, , p) and s. (ii) \Yn(sn, .) E C'.
In a RREE there is only one price associated with each of a finite number of joint signals, so only a finite number of equilibrium prices are possible. However, during the learning process many prices other than the RREE price may occur for any given joint signal. Hence, models must be defined for all feasible signal-price pairs if the boundedly rational version of Bayesian learning is to result in a well-defined learning rule.' DEFINITION 4. Let {p, ; s E S) be a RREE. A rational model for' trader rz is a model ul, such that YJ(s),,p,)(s) = 1 for all s E S.
We denote by Y(s,p) the vector of models (YJ(s), ,p))f, 1. A vector of rational models has the property that Y(s,p,) = a,.
We are not concerned with the precise relationship between models and equilibrium prices. Our only concern is that in a neighborhood of some models of particular interest the relationship is continuous. We guarantee this by studying models regular in a neighborhood of some equilibrium. Recall that a point x in the domain of a function f is a regular point if Df(x) is a surjective linear map from the tangent space of the domain al x to the tangent space of the range at f(x). Fortunately it is easy to find regular models. Proposition 1 shows that for any economy satisfying A.5, any rational model is regular at the RREE. we have assumed models to be C', it should be clear from the proofs that models need only be locally C' in certain neighborhoods.
The next proposition shows that regularity is a generic property of vectors of models. itrarily near to C such that A +BC has full rank. QED. e conclude from Propositions 1 and 2 that restricting attention to regular models is not a particularly binding constraint.
DYNAMICS
We posit dynamics in which a trader tries to learn which of several models is correct. Each trader considers models !Ynl,..., initially a prior distribution representing his beliefs about which models are correct. The dynamics are as follows. Each trader begins with a vector Ano representing his prior distribution on the models. Ano is an element of the positive unit simplex A Mn-'. A joint signal s E S is randomly drawn, and each trader learns (s),. When trader n observes price vector p and signal (.s),~ his beliefs about s E S are given by the probability distribution CZL 1 L,, )unm((s>, , P). After th e market clears, traders are informed of the true joint signal s. They compute their posterior distributions A,, by a~~ly~~g a learning rule. Then the process begins again.
We begin by considering learning rules. DEFINITION 6. A learning rule for trader n is a function I, : S X AX-' X A&-l + Ah-l, n nt= 4(St--17Pt-l~ Lt-1).
We impose only two restrictions on learning rules. The likelihood property requires that trader N'S confidence in model ul,,,, increase if and only if model Y,,, predicts the outcome in the previous period better than does the "average model." For a correctly specified model, Bayesian updating generates a specific learning rule that satisfies A.6.' In our equilibrium framework, however, the learning rule need not be statistically correct as the updating mechanism in A.6 may be misspecified. We call the learning rule boundedly rational as it applies Bayesian updating to models that ignore only the effect of learning itself on observations.
We write d, = @it,..., A,,), and Also, let I= (2 , ,..., I,), where 2, = (1, 0 ,.,., 0), and Y, = ( !Yv,, ,..., ul,,). In order to specify the sequence of temporary equilibria that obtain, we need to specify how the equilibrium prices vary with 1. All we require is some continuity, which comes from regularity properties of the models. and the domain of definition is the intersection of the domains of definition of the g,. We give sufficient conditions for ?L to be a locally stable stationary point of (*), and then apply this condition to rational models. (i) the vector of models !PI is regular al prices { p, ; s E S),
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YdWn~ P,>(S) > Yds),~ P,)(S) for all a? = I,..., IV; and s E S.
Then 2 is a locally stable rest point of (*>.
The intuition behind the proof is illustrated in Fig. 1 . Trader n is choosing between models !Py,, and !Py,,. If At is sufficiently near X, then g,(A,) will be near enough to P, so that ~J(s>~, g,(L)>(s) > u/n2i(sL7 g,@,>>(s>. The likelihood property then implies that An,t+I,l > A,,,. If this is the situation for all n and all SES, then /Ix-./2_,Il>IIx-A,+.Ij/.
Continuity of the functions I, then imply that lim,,, A, = IL. This theorem relies on the assumption that each agent has a finite signal set and considers only a finite number of models. Whether or not a similar result would hold with a continuum is an open question. Bray [2] has demonstrated stability of the rational model with a continuum in a specific partial equilibrium model with linear supply and demand functions.
Proof of Theorem 1. Take as a norm for nf=, dMX-' the I, norm /Ia-a'Il=C~==,C~,la,,-a~,(. Q.E.D.
It is easy to construct examples using Theorem 1 for which, even though traders may be considering rational models, a non-rational model is locally stable. Proof. Again, the conditions of Theorem 1 are easily seen to be satisfied. Q.E.D.
EXAMPLES
Since the hypothesis of rationality ties down the prediction of a model only at the RREE prices it is easy to construct examples in which a rational model is locaily stable, a non-rational model is locally stable, or cycles may occur. Such an example may he constructed using the utiiity functions. and endowments from Radner's example 141 of the existence of RREE. In this example there are two types of traders; informed traders who all receive a signal s = 1 or 2 and uninformed traders who receive no signal. Suppose the uninformed traders are choosing between a rational mode: IV, and a nonrational model !P* as illustrated in Fig. 2 . Whether I= (I9 0) or 2 = (0, I) is locally stable or cycles occur depends on the relationship between /3, a and l;~ Let A, be the uninformed traders weight on !PI. If: (i) p > E > q then 1 is locally stable.
(ii) q > s > j3 then x is locally stable. systematically wrong. For example, when s = 1 occurs q1 always results but Y2 puts probability p < 1 on this event (see Fig. 1 ). It could be argued that traders should recognize this error and modify their behavior. The obvious modification is to include a method of hypothesis testing and model revision in the learning rule. This modification is not included in our analysis as it raises numerous conceptual and technical questions. In particular, the observed relation between prices and signals will not persist if traders somehow consider a new model (i.e., one other than Iv, or YJ. So there seems to be no obvious way to correctly revise a model.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has two results: a local stability theorem for rational models and also a global instability theorem. The learning process may get stuck at an incorrect model because all of the admissible models are incorrect away from the RREE. No model tries to forecast the expectations of other traders, and so the set of admissible models is too small to describe the full behavior of the economy. Whether enlarging the set of admissible models-in particular, by admitting richer models that estimate the expectations of other traders-will eliminate stable non-rational models is an open question. With the finite collection of models treated in this paper there does exist a trivial learning rule which gives almost sure convergence to a RREE. Suppose that at date 1 each trader arbitrarily chooses a model and acts as if he believes this model to be correct. Each trader continues to use this model until it gives a prediction which is incorrect. 3 When a trader decides that his model is incorrect, he randomly chooses another model from his finite set of models. With probability 1 there exists t < cc such that at I each trader is using model Ynu,, . Then each U,, predicts correctly and so no trader will abandon it.
We have two objections to this learning mechanism. First, it is not at all related to anything that statistical decision theory might suggest. The learning models of Section 3 arise from Bayesian learning with incorrectly specified conditional distributions.
The learning model we have just described has no trace of rationality attached to it. For example, traders will often reject models that are only slightly incorrect in favor of models that are abominably wrong. Second, the nice behavior of this rule is a clear artifact of the finiteness of the model. 31n the case where a model predicts a distribution of states, each trader might do a hypothesis test based on the empirical distribution of states at a given price and switch models only when the null hypothesis (that the model is correct) is rejected. The Glivent*Cantelli Theorem and the corresponding ZLT can be used to show that such models will ultimately be rejected.
